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Abstract
The global over-the-counter derivatives market exceeded $33 trillion of gross market value as
of year-end 2008, according to the Bank for International Settlements.1 Recent headlines suggest
that derivatives – specifically, credit default swaps – pose an enormous potential systemic risk and
that they are one of the root causes of the current economic crisis.2
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The global over-the-counter derivatives market exceeded $33  
trillion of gross market value as of year-end 2008, according to the Bank 
for International Settlements.1  Recent headlines suggest that derivatives 
– specifically, credit default swaps – pose an enormous potential  
systemic risk and that they are one of the root causes of the current  
economic crisis.2
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      1.   See Mark Brown, OTC Derivatives Volume Fell, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2009, at 
C5.  Gross market value is the cost of replacing existing OTC derivatives contracts.  
Market size is often stated in terms of notional value, but gross market value is a better 
measure of the level of risk in the derivatives market.  The size of the market is as of 
December 31, 2008.  Gross market value rose 66.5% in the second half of 2008 even 
though aggregate notional amount fell 13.4% (to $592 trillion from $684 trillion). 
      2.   For example, the obligations associated with credit default swaps and other  
derivative positions that were not fully hedged have been held responsible for American 
International Group’s financial distress.  See Liam Pleven & Randall Smith, Action on 
AIG Unit May Cost Taxpayers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2009, at C1. 
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2010, has warned, “Derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruc-
tion.”3  This remark suggests that these instruments should carry the 
warning,  
“Improper use can be hazardous to your financial health.”  Mounting 
concerns over derivatives have recently led the U.S. Treasury to propose 
a comprehensive regulatory framework to bring greater transparency to 
the derivatives market, restrict derivatives trading, and impose closer 
supervision on derivatives market participants to reduce systemic risk.4  
Importantly, the proposals call for amending the Commodity Exchange 
Act and the securities laws to “prevent market manipulation, fraud, and 
other market abuses.”5
Derivatives, when used properly, improve economic efficiency and 
allow companies to manage unwanted risk exposures.  Allegations of 
derivatives abuse in recent litigation provide a stern reminder that  
substantial damage can occur when they are misapplied.
 
6
                                                          
      3.   Annual Letter to Shareholders from Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire  
Hathaway, Inc., Feb. 21, 2003, at 15, available at 
  A review of 
court records highlights how important it is for market participants to 
understand these instruments before using them.  Court records reveal 
that the complexity of derivatives often leads to misunderstandings and 
is sometimes exploited by unscrupulous financial promoters to take  
unfair advantage of unsophisticated or unsuspecting investors.  The  
apparent investor acceptance of Bernard Madoff’s purported ‘split-
strike’ strategy—in which the execution of stock call and put options 
supposedly enabled the fund to achieve superior risk-adjusted returns—  
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf.  But see Damien Paletta,  
Democrats Deny Buffett on a Key Provision, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2010 (stating  
Buffett’s “Berkshire [Hathaway] has $63 billion in derivatives contracts, and Mr.  
Buffett has boasted he holds very little collateral against these products”). 
      4.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Regulatory Reform Over-the-Counter 
(OTC) Derivatives (May 13, 2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg129.htm; 
see also Sarah N. Lynch & Serena Ng, U.S. Moves to Regulate Derivatives Trade, 
WALL ST. J., May 14, 2009, at C1, C3.  The regulatory proposals would require  
standardized OTC derivatives to be traded on regulated exchanges or electronic trading 
platforms and cleared through regulated centralized clearinghouses, impose greater 
record-keeping and trade reporting requirements on derivatives dealings, increase  
regulatory oversight of derivatives dealers with large counterparty exposures, and give 
regulators authority to establish limits on derivatives positions to control risk. 
      5.   U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 4. 
      6.   The article updates an earlier article by one of the co-authors.  See John D.  
Finnerty & Mark S. Brown, An Overview of Derivatives Litigation, 1994 to 2000, 7 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 131 (2001). 
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is a case in point.7
Derivatives are financial instruments whose value depends on the 
value of some underlying asset price, reference rate, or index.
 
8  They 
have been written on commodities, currencies, stocks, bonds, interest 
rates, credit spreads, assorted indexes, and other quantities.  Both  
individuals and financial institutions use derivatives.  They allow  
investors to assume or offload selected risks.  The application of  
derivatives can range from outright, and perfectly legal, speculation to 
hedging.  At the most basic level, derivatives channel risks from hedgers 
who wish to avoid them to speculators who are willing to bear them for 
a price.9  Securities dealers have used financial derivatives to craft  
synthetic financial instruments which mimic the returns of investing in a 
particular asset without purchasing it.  Synthetic derivatives are  
attractive when the market for the asset is illiquid and investing in it 
would, therefore, be very risky.  Due to a combination of market  
volatility being magnified by the financial leverage inherent in  
derivative instruments, the increasing complexity of the newer  
derivative instruments, and the lack of sophistication on the part of many 
derivatives buyers and sellers, many derivatives users have failed to 
realize their goals.  In some cases, investors have suffered large losses 
and have resorted to litigation to try to recoup these losses.10
This article describes derivatives, briefly explains how they can be 
used to improve market efficiency, and provides an overview of  
derivatives lawsuits filed, and regulatory enforcement actions taken, in 
the United States between 2001 and 2009.  It classifies cases by type and 
number for each type of derivative instrument and summarizes the  
dominant trends.  It also discusses several cases which highlight  
important legal and financial issues raised by recent derivatives  
 
                                                          
      7.   Carole Bernard & Phelim Boyle, Mr. Madoff’s Amazing Returns: An Analysis of 
the Split-Strike Conversion Strategy, 2 (U. of Waterloo Working Paper, 2009),  
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1371320. 
      8. JOHN D. FINNERTY, THE PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS CREDIT DERIVATIVES 
PRIMER 3 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, New York 1998) [hereinafter FINNERTY PWC 
1998]. 
      9.   A derivative transaction can also enable both parties to hedge their respective 
risk exposures, as for example, when a farm cooperative enters into a corn forward  
contract with a food processing firm calling for the future delivery of a stated number of 
bushels of corn at a specific price per bushel.  Both the cooperative and the firm can 
benefit from the consequent reduction in their exposure to corn price risk.   
     10.  John D. Finnerty & Mark S. Brown, An Overview of Derivatives Litigation, 
1994 to 2000, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 131, 132 (2001). 
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litigation. 
 
II. DESCRIPTION OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS 
This section provides a brief description of the derivative  
instruments11 covered in the rest of the article.  It briefly explains how 
they can be used to improve market efficiency and also how they have 
been misused at times, which has led to litigation.  It is important to  
appreciate that while derivative instruments may be used to reallocate 
risk between parties, they do not make risk go away.  One party to a  
derivatives contract reduces (or hedges) its risk exposure by transferring 
it to the counterparty, who is presumably better able to manage this risk 
or is willing to bear it at lower cost than the party who transferred it.  
But the counterparty, to whom the risk is transferred, must figure out 
how to deal with it.12
A. FORWARD CONTRACT 
 
A forward contract13 obligates the holder to buy a specified amount 
of a particular asset at a stated price on a particular date in the future.  
All these terms are fixed at the time the parties enter into the forward 
contract.  The specified future price is called the exercise price.  Fixing 
the exercise price eliminates each counterparty’s unwanted price risk 
exposure.  Forward contracts were written on commodities as early as 
the 1840s.14
                                                          
     11.  FINNERTY PWC 1998, supra note 8; see also JOHN FINNERTY, STRUCTURING 
INSTRUMENTS TO ADJUST RISK EXPOSURE: THE ARITHMETIC OF FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENTS 2 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, New York 1999) [hereinafter FINNERTY 
PWC 1999]. 
  Most forward contracts are for commodities or currencies.  
Forward contracts are customized and are traded over-the-counter.   
      12.   See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  In the example discussed in footnote 
9, where both parties to the derivative contract reduce their risk exposure, each party 
transfers unwanted risk to its counterparty.  The farm cooperative transfers the risk of 
an unwanted decrease in the price it will receive for its corn, and the food processor 
transfers the risk of an unwanted increase in the price it will pay for the corn.  The farm 
cooperative also forgoes the benefit of a price increase, and the food processor also  
forgoes the benefit of a price decrease as the price they pay for transferring the  
unwanted risk to the other party. 
      13.   FINNERTY PWC 1999, supra note 11, at 2. 
      14.   Id. 
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Customization enables them to be tailored to better suit the needs of the 
two counterparties. 
Forward contracts are useful in eliminating price uncertainty  
because the two parties agree on the price at which the asset will change 
hands when the contract matures.  If the market price at the time the 
contract matures is higher than the exercise price, then the buyer of the 
forward contract will realize a profit.  But if the market price is less than 
the exercise price, then the buyer will realize a loss, as illustrated in  
Exhibit 1.  The seller is in exactly the opposite position, realizing a  
profit when the market price is less than the exercise price and a loss 
when the market price exceeds the exercise price. 
Exhibit 1 
Payoff Profile of a Forward Contract 
 
 
B. FUTURES CONTRACT 
A futures contract15
                                                          
      15.   Id. at 3. 
 is just like a forward contract except that it is a 
standardized, exchange-traded instrument.  Futures contracts were  
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developed in the 1860s to deal with the default risk inherent in forward 
contracts.16  When the buyer or the seller under a forward contract faced 
a large potential loss, that party had an incentive not to perform and in 
many cases reneged on its obligation.  To avoid this problem, trades  
involving futures contracts are settled through a clearinghouse, which 
guarantees the performance of the buyer and the seller who are the  
parties to each futures contract.  The clearinghouse stands between the  
buyer and the seller as soon as the futures contract is entered into.  The 
clearinghouse marks each party’s position to market each day and  
requires the party with a loss to post sufficient collateral to guarantee its 
ability to settle the contract.  Thus, unlike forward contracts, the gains 
and losses on futures contracts are realized daily.17
The payoff diagram for a futures contract looks just like the payoff 
diagram for a forward contract in Exhibit 1.  Futures contracts have the 
advantages of being exchange-traded, which makes them more liquid 
than otherwise similar forward contracts.  They are also free of default 
risk.  Standardization means that there are usually well-accepted  
valuation models available for valuing standard contracts, which lessens 
the likelihood of valuation disputes.  However, their standardization can 
limit their usefulness; as the parties will have to design a forward  
contract when they desire special features that are not available in the 
existing futures contracts. 
 
The issue of whether a particular contract is a futures contract, a 
forward contract, or some other type of contract has arisen in disputes, 
such as Olympic Natural Gas Co. v. Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc., 
which is discussed later in the article.18
C. OPTION CONTRACTS 
 
An option contract19
                                                          
      16.   Id. at 2. 
 gives its holder the right (but not the  
obligation) to purchase or sell a specified underlying asset at a stated 
price (the exercise price or strike price) on or before a specified  
expiration date.  A call option conveys the right to buy the specified  
      17.  For similar reasons, the U.S. Treasury has proposed the establishment of a  
centralized clearinghouse to clear all credit default swap transactions.  See U.S. Dep’t of 
the Treasury, supra note 4. 
      18.   294 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 2002). 
      19.   FINNERTY PWC 1999, supra note 11, at 4. 
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asset, and a put option conveys the right to sell the underlying asset.  For 
example, a call option might give the holder the right to buy 100 shares 
of Exxon Mobil common stock at a price of $40 per share anytime  
within the next six months.  The holder will exercise the call option so 
long as the market price exceeds the specified strike price on the  
exercise date, in this case $40 at the end of six months, and the holder of 
a put option will exercise when the strike price exceeds the market price 
on the exercise date.  In either case, the option is said to be in-the-
money.  Conversely, an option is said to be out-of-the-money, when 
immediate exercise would not be profitable, and if the option has 
reached expiration, the holder will let it expire worthless. 
Exhibit 2 illustrates the payoffs on call options and put options.  
When a market participant buys a call option, she receives a higher 
payoff on the exercise date the greater is the excess of the market price 
of the underlying asset above the exercise price .  If the market price is 
below the exercise price on the exercise date, then the payoff is zero.  
When a market participant buys a put option, she receives a higher 
payoff on the exercise date the greater is the excess of the exercise price 
above the market price of the underlying asset.  If the market price is 
above the exercise price on the exercise date, then the payoff is zero. 
Exhibit 2 illustrates the option payoffs just before the options are 
set to expire.  This value is referred to as an option’s intrinsic value.  
Importantly, options also have a time value before they expire because 
changes in the underlying asset price before expiration could increase 
the expected payoff by rising (for a call option) or falling (for a put  
option).  The remaining time value is greater the longer is the option’s  
remaining time to expiration because the greater time to expiration  
allows for larger possible favorable price movements. 
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Exhibit 2 
Option Payoff Profiles 
 
Call options are attractive to investors who expect the price of the 
underlying asset to rise.  They pay a relatively small option premium to 
obtain the opportunity for a large potential gain depending on whether 
and how high the price of the underlying asset rises.  This large potential 
for gain in relation to the price paid for the option is referred to as the 
leverage provided by the option. 
A put option is attractive to investors who expect the price of an  
asset to fall.  The put option provides a form of insurance because the 
holder will realize at least this price no matter how low the price of the 
underlying asset falls.  One can think of conventional auto insurance as a 
form of put option: the car owner can put/sell what is left of her car to 
the insurer in return for the insured amount if the car is destroyed in an 
accident.20
                                                          
      20.   Id. 
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Warrants are call options that a firm issues.  These options are  
exercisable for the firm’s own common shares.  Warrants are at the  
center of R.A. Mackie & Co. v. PetroCorp Inc., in which it was alleged 
that an acquiring firm forced the premature exercise of the acquired 
firm’s outstanding warrants and thereby deprived the warrant holders of 
the warrants’ remaining time value.21
Employee stock options (ESOs) are call options that a firm writes 
on shares of its common stock, and issues to its employees.
 
22  Firms 
usually set the strike price equal to the market price of the firm’s stock 
on the grant date.  By selecting an earlier date on which the stock price 
was lower and treating that date as the grant date, a firm’s executives 
convert an at-the-money call option into an in-the-money call option.  
Backdating increases the ESOs’ value and benefits the employee at the 
expense of the firm.  The scandal surrounding employee stock option 
backdating arose because the executives of hundreds of firms backdated 
their ESOs but concealed the backdating from their firms’  
shareholders.23
A call option and a put option can be combined to create what is 
known as a collar.  For example, an investor who owns common shares 
can buy a put option to limit her downside risk to the strike price of the 
put option.  She can sell a call option to pay for part of the cost of the 
put option.  If the price of the call option equals the cost of the put  
option, the collar is called a zero-cost collar.  The strike price of the call 
is higher than the strike price of the put.  The investor gives up any  
appreciation above this strike price because the purchaser of the call  
option will exercise the call when the share price exceeds this  
threshold.
 
24
Securities fraud often involves options.  They are difficult to value 
because of their complexity.  Most options trade in the over-the-counter 
market, rather than on an exchange.  The lack of market prices makes it 
difficult to determine what they are worth.  They employ leverage  
because the option premium is only a fraction of the price of the  
 
                                                          
      21.   329 F. Supp. 2d 477, 481-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
      22.  John D. Finnerty, Extending the Black-Scholes-Merton Model to Value  
Employee Stock Options, 15 J. APPLIED FIN. 25, 25 (2005). 
      23.  J.M. Bickley & G. Shorter. (2008). Stock Options: The Backdating Issue 
(RL33926). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/504/. 
       24.   The Madoff Ponzi scheme involved an investment strategy that supposedly 
incorporated collars using S&P 100 Index put and call options.  Bernard & Boyle, supra 
note 7, at 2.  The scheme is described later in this article. 
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underlying instrument.  Because of this leverage, options magnify the 
potential gain as compared to a direct investment in the underlying, but 
they also magnify the potential for loss because the entire investment in 
the option will be lost if it expires out-of-the-money. 
The potential for large gains, complexity, and lack of market prices 
can attract disreputable promoters who offer investors structured  
investments that incorporate a complex option which seem to offer large 
potential returns.  Fraud occurs when this investment is intentionally 
overpriced or its riskiness is misrepresented. 
Options have also been involved in a number of tax shelter cases.25
D. SWAP CONTRACTS
  
In many such cases, the potentially large payoffs on the options were 
neutralized by buying and simultaneously selling nearly identical call 
options that had only a very small difference in their strike prices. 
26
The two parties to a swap agreement exchange payment obligations 
tied to specified interest rates, exchange rates, asset prices, or indexes.  
Swaps are of several types - interest rate swaps and currency swaps  
being the most common.  In a “plain vanilla” interest rate swap, two 
counterparties exchange interest payment obligations, with one agreeing 
to pay a fixed interest rate and the other a floating interest rate based on 
a stated notional principal amount.  The floating rate is usually based on 
one of the London Interbank Offer Rates (LIBOR).
 
27  Principal is not 
exchanged, and the interest amounts due on each payment date are  
netted, which reduces default risk.  Interest rate swaps have been the 
central issue in many cases, including Lehman Brothers Commercial 
Corp. v. Minmetals International Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co.28 
and In re Plastech Engineered Products, Inc.,29
                                                          
      25.   See, e.g., Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 412 F. Supp. 2d 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 which are discussed lat-
      26.   FINNERTY PWC 1999, supra note 11. 
      27.   LIBOR are interest rates that are determined in the money market.  Dollar and 
sterling LIBOR are determined in the London money market.  They are the interest 
rates at which major banks lend one another funds denominated in a particular currency.  
LIBOR are quoted for various tenors, such overnight, one week, one month, three 
months, six months, and so on.  Three-month LIBOR is most common in bank loans 
and interest rate swaps with payments made quarterly. 
      28.   179 F. Supp. 2d 159, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
      29.   399 B.R. 1, 4-5 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008). 
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er in the article. 
In a “plain vanilla” currency swap, the cash flows are denominated 
in two different currencies.  In effect, the two counterparties extend one 
another back-to-back loans, which are consolidated into a single  
transaction.30
Interest rate swaps are useful for hedging interest rate risk.
  An asset swap involves an obligation to pay interest based 
on a specified fixed or floating interest rate in return for an obligation 
representing the total return on a specified reference asset or index. 
31  For 
example, suppose a corporation has floating rate debt outstanding but 
the treasurer is concerned that interest rates are quite likely to rise.  She 
can have the corporation enter into a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap 
by agreeing to pay a stated fixed rate and to receive in return a series of 
payments based on a specified floating interest rate, as illustrated in  
Exhibit 3.  The floating interest rate payments in the swap will fully  
offset the floating interest rate payments on the bank loan when the swap 
floating rate and the bank loan interest rate float off the same index.  The 
corporation is left paying the fixed rate.  Similarly, suppose an investor 
owns a fixed rate bond, expects interest rates to increase, but does not 
want to sell the bond.  She can enter into a swap, agreeing to pay fixed 
rates in return for receiving floating rates in order to take advantage of 
the expected increase in interest rates.32
                                                          
      30.   Back-to-back loans (or parallel loans), which were developed in the 1960s, 
were the precursor to interest rate swaps.  Financial engineers realized that the two 
back-to-back loans could be collapsed into a single instrument and given other desirable 
features, such as netting of periodic payments and basing the periodic payments on  
notional amounts, rather than exchanging principal, to reduce default risk.  
 
      31.   FINNERTY PWC 1999, supra note 11. 
      32.  This is the opposite of the payment pattern illustrated in Exhibit 3.  Put  
somewhat differently, the counterparty to the corporation in the fixed-for-floating  
interest rate swap discussed earlier in the paragraph agrees to pay the stated floating rate 
and to receive in return a series of payments based on the stated fixed interest rate.    
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Exhibit 3 
Cash Flows of a Pay-Fixed Interest Rate Swap 
 
Asset swaps are similar to interest rate swaps except that one of the 
payment streams is based on the total return on a specified asset.  The 
asset swap is referred to as an equity swap when the specified asset is a 
stated number of shares of a particular firm’s common stock.  Total  
return is calculated as current payments, e.g., dividends, plus  
appreciation or minus depreciation in the market value of the underlying 
asset.33
Equity swaps are like interest rate swaps except that the total return 
on a specified equity instrument replaces the fixed interest rate payments 
as one leg of the swap.  The floating rate leg, which is usually based on 
one of the LIBOR rates, remains the same.  In a typical equity swap, the 
initial value of the equity instrument is the notional amount of the swap 
on which the periodic interest payments are calculated.  The equity 
payment receiver receives cash dividends and any increase in the value 
of the equity instrument during the period but pays the counterparty the 
amount of any decrease in equity value during the period.
  Asset swaps create the economic equivalent of borrowing funds 
to buy the asset, which is in effect, conveying ownership of a synthetic 
asset.  Synthetic assets are attractive to investors who want to “own” the 
asset but either do not want to take physical possession of it or believe 
that their trading will have a large enough market impact that it will  
affect the price of the asset to their disadvantage. 
34
                                                          
      33.  The total return receiver receives the periodic appreciation, e.g., the increase in 
the value of the shares, from the counterparty and pays the periodic depreciation, e.g., 
the decrease in the value of the shares, to the counterparty. 
  For  
example, if an investor wishes to realize the total return on 10,000 shares 
of a particular stock that is selling for $30 per share, the investor can  
engage in a swap synthetically representing an underlying amounting to 
10,000 shares of the stock.  The notional principal is $300,000.  The  
      34. See Note, Tax-Exempt Entities, Notional Principal Contracts, and the  
Unrelated Business Income Tax, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1269 (1992). 
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investor would make quarterly payments to the counterparty on the 
$300,000 notional principal at 3-month LIBOR.  If the price of the stock 
fell $5 during the quarter, the investor would pay the counterparty 
$50,000, and if it rose $5, the counterparty would pay her $50,000.  If 
the stock paid a $1 cash dividend during the quarter, the counterparty 
would pay her $10,000.  Equity swaps were at the center of Caiola v.  
Citibank, which is discussed later in the article.35
E. THE FOUR BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS 
 
Forward contracts, futures contracts, options, and swaps have been 
referred to as the four basic building blocks of derivative instruments.36  
They have the distinctive payment patterns described in the preceding 
paragraphs.  The payment characteristics of these instruments are more 
closely related than might appear at first glance.  A clever derivatives 
trader can use different derivative instruments almost interchangeably to 
achieve any particular payoff pattern.37  The trader might do this be-
cause of a tax or regulatory advantage of one structure over another or to 
game the accounting regulations and achieve a more desired accounting  
treatment.38
                                                          
      35.   295 F.3d 312, 316-17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
  Exhibit 4 illustrates the relationship among the basic  
building blocks. 
      36.   Charles W. Smithson, Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & D. Sykes Wilford, MANAGING 
FINANCIAL RISK: A GUIDE TO DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS, FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, AND 
VALUE MAXIMIZATION 42 (Irwin 1995). 
      37.   Id. at 41. 
      38.   At one time, swaps were especially popular because of a quirk in the account-
ing rules.  “Swap contracts” could be kept off the firm’s balance sheet so long as the 
value of the swap at initiation was zero, as was usually the case.  This led to accounting 
abuses that eventually resulted in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 133 
(“FAS 133”).  FAS 133 transformed the accounting for derivatives from a regime based 
largely on the form of the transaction to one based on the derivative instrument’s true 
economic character. 
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Exhibit 4 
Relationships Among the Four Basic Building Blocks 
 
The basic building blocks are used by derivatives dealers to craft 
more complex financial instruments that have more desirable payment 
patterns.  The basic building blocks can be combined with conventional 
bonds to create new securities.39  For example, combining a fixed-rate 
bond and an interest rate swap that pays fixed rates and receives floating 
rates creates what is known as an inverse floating rate note.40
The basic building blocks are also useful in analyzing complex  
contingent claims.  Such instruments typically incorporate one or more 
of the basic building blocks.  By comparing the payoffs of the complex 
contingent claim in different economic scenarios to the distinctive  
signatures of the basic building blocks, it is usually possible to reverse 
engineer the contingent claim and break it down into its constituent 
parts. 
 
This process in turn aids in understanding how the instrument 
                                                          
      39.   FINNERTY PWC 1999, supra note 11. 
      40.   See id.  For example, combining an 8% bond and an interest rate swap that 
pays 7% and receives LIBOR creates a note that pays 15% - LIBOR.  LIBOR is the 
London Inter Bank Offer Rate, which is the interest rate at which banks lend each other 
funds in the London money market.  Some investors find such bonds attractive because 
the coupon varies inversely with interest rates, which causes the bonds to exhibit  
heightened interest rate sensitivity (duration). 
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works and suggests how to value it and how to hedge the risks inherent 
in it.  For example, a callable corporate bond is a straight bond plus a 
bond call option.  As a second example, a convertible bond is a straight 
bond plus the (conversion) option to exchange it for a stated number of 
shares of the bond issuer’s common stock. 
F. SYNTHETIC SECURITIES 
A synthetic security is a contractual agreement between two parties, 
usually an investor and a financial institution, which is designed to  
replicate the total investment return of a particular physical security, 
such as share of common stock or a call option.  For example, an equity 
swap provides the equity payment receiver with the same stream of  
returns she would receive if she owned the underlying common shares 
directly, and is therefore a synthetic share.  The aggregate market value 
of the underlying asset at the inception of the synthetic transaction is the 
notional amount, and the investor is charged interest on this notional 
amount.  Thus, the synthetic security represents a leveraged investment 
in the underlying physical security. 
Trading in synthetic securities can be cheaper or less risky than 
trading the physical securities when the latter are thinly traded or  
maintaining open positions in them is expensive.  Synthetic trading often 
avoids the need to post large amounts of margin capital and permits 
large positions to be opened and closed quickly with less market impact.  
Caiola v. Citibank, which is discussed later in the article, concerns a  
situation where an investor traded enormous numbers of shares and  
options on a particular stock, and synthetic transactions offered several 
advantages over physical transactions.41  The advantages of synthetic 
equity transactions over physical transactions in avoiding the necessity 
of posting large amounts of margin, allowing positions to be established 
and unwound quickly, and permitting the effective purchase of large 
amounts of stock without affecting the market price were a central issue 
in Caiola v. Citibank.42  However, the economic equivalence of  
synthetic and real assets can become problematic, as illustrated by CSX 
v. Children’s Investment Fund Management, when circumstances cause 
the synthetic asset to convey beneficial (legal) ownership of the  
underlying asset.43
                                                          
      41.   295 F.3d at 312. 
  This case is discussed later in the article. 
      42.   Id. at 316. 
      43.   562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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G. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
A credit default swap44 (“CDS”) promises to make a specified 
payment in the event a particular debt instrument experiences an event 
of default, such as a payment default or if the issuer files for bankruptcy 
protection.  For example, a General Motors CDS might promise to pay 
the difference between the face amount and the market price of a  
particular GM bond if GM defaults on its debt.  A CDS functions like a 
letter of credit, which is typically issued by a bank, or a surety bond, 
which is typically issued by an insurance company.45
A CDS is a form of insurance.
 
46
Exhibit 5 
The Basic Structure of a Credit Default Swap 
  It enables the CDS buyer to insure 
against an event of default or some other specified credit event involving 
the specified underlying financial instrument.  It requires a single  
upfront payment, or possibly a series of payments, in exchange for the 
counterparty’s obligation to make an insurance payment that is  
contingent upon the occurrence of any one of a specified set of possible 
credit events.  This payment structure is illustrated in Exhibit 5.  The  
insurer is exposed to the risk of default because it must pay off on the 
contract when a credit event occurs.  When the CDS seller fails to  
reinsure this risk by entering into offsetting CDS or buying conventional 
reinsurance, it is exposed to a potentially large loss. 
 
 
American International Group’s financial distress has been  
attributed in part to the large amount of CDS contracts it apparently 
wrote on collateralized debt obligations, which were only partially 
                                                          
      44.   FINNERTY PWC 1998, supra note 8, at 15. 
      45.   Id. 
      46.   Id. 
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hedged, thus leaving it with a large net default risk exposure when this 
market collapsed in 2008.47
CDS contracts have been the subject of several lawsuits, for  
example, concerning whether an event of default has occurred.
 
48  They 
are likely to give rise to additional litigation because of the recent  
financial crisis.  The Hoosier Energy Rural Electricity Cooperative v. 
John Hancock Life Insurance Company49 and Merrill Lynch v. XL  
Capital Assurance50
H. COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS 
 discussed later in the article, are but two recent  
examples. 
A collateralized debt obligation51
                                                          
      47.   Plevin & Smith, supra note 2, at C1. 
 (“CDO”) is an asset-backed  
security that is backed either by bonds (collateralized bond obligation, or 
“CBO”) or bank loans (collateralized loan obligation, or “CLO”) or a 
combination of the two.  A portfolio of fixed income assets is pooled 
and contributed to a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”), which is a  
separate legal entity, such as a trust.  The trust issues multiple classes of 
debt instruments and at least one equity class.  The pool of assets serves 
as collateral and the main source of cash flow for the several classes of 
debt securities the SPV issues.  These CDO classes are prioritized as to 
their right to receive the cash flow from the underlying fixed income 
portfolio.  This prioritization reallocates the default risk, or credit risk, 
on the underlying portfolio so that the most senior CDO class, which 
      48.   See, e.g., AON Fin. Prods. v. Societe Generale, 476 F.3d 90, 92-93 (2d Cir. 
2007).  In AON, plaintiffs brought suit for alleged breach of contract related to a credit 
default swap agreement between the parties.  Plaintiffs asserted that a "credit event"  
occurred when a Philippine government agency defaulted on a surety bond.  Defendant 
argued that the agency was not included in the definition of "Republic of Philippines," 
the reference entity of the parties' contract, and thus, the default was not a credit event.   
The number of disputes concerning whether an event of default has occurred  
diminished after the International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA) published a  
standard definition of "events of default." See ISDA, 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives  
Definitions 1, Exhibit A, at 61 (2003). 
      49.   Hoosier Energy Rural Electricity Coop. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 
F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009). 
      50.   Merrill Lynch Int'l v. XL Capital Assurance Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 298, 299-300 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
      51.   John D. Finnerty, Securities Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCE: FINANCIAL 
MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS, vol. I, ch. 7, 61 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. 2008). 
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was often rated triple-A or double-A, has the least exposure to defaults 
on the underlying portfolio, and the most junior CDO class, which is an 
unrated equity class, has the greatest exposure.52
Exhibit 6 illustrates a typical cash flow CDO structure, which  
contains bonds, bank loans, or some combination of the two.
 
53
Exhibit 6 
Illustration of a Cash Flow CDO Structure 
  The  
senior tranche has the lowest exposure to default risk on the underlying 
collateral, and the equity class has the greatest exposure.  Even the  
senior-most class can experience losses if the default rates on the  
underlying collateral are high enough and the junior tranches are not 
large enough to absorb fully the entire losses due to these defaults. 
 
 
A series of cash allocation rules specify how to distribute the cash 
flows obtained from the underlying portfolio on each payment date 
among the various CDO classes/tranches of bonds with differing risk 
characteristics.  The CDO collateral can range from high-yield bonds to 
                                                          
      52.   Hundreds of triple-A-rated senior classes were downgraded in 2008 as the  
rating agencies began to realize that the underlying collateral was experiencing much 
higher default rates than had previously been expected.  
      53.   Synthetic CDOs contain credit default swaps and other financial instruments 
that synthetically replicate a portfolio of bonds and bank loans. 
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emerging market debt to corporate loans to mortgages.  The  
methodology designed to channel cash flows depends upon the nature of 
the risk of the collateral and investor preferences.  For instance, in the 
case of agency mortgages, prepayment and the consequent shortening of 
duration is the key issue.  However, investors such as pension funds  
prefer long duration assets from the perspective of asset-liability  
management.  Therefore, the structuring exercise focuses on designing 
different classes of derivative instruments that match the tolerances of 
investors for differing exposures to prepayment risk and to default risk.  
Similarly, certain investors are not permitted to purchase bonds that are 
rated below investment-grade.54
It is important to appreciate that default risk is not eliminated; it is 
simply reallocated among the classes of derivative securities issued by 
the SPV.  The senior SPV classes have less default risk than the  
underlying pool of assets, but the more junior SPV classes have more 
default risk.  The most junior classes (subordinated and equity classes in 
Exhibit 6) bear disproportionately large default risk.  If the underlying 
pool of assets has a high level of default risk, for example, because it 
contains subprime mortgages, then the opportunities for risk reallocation 
are consequently more limited, and recent experience indicates that even 
the senior-most SPV classes are likely to have a high degree of default 
risk. 
  In this case, the cash flow allocation 
rules prioritize the distribution of the cash flows, which can create one 
or more classes of higher-grade bonds from lower-grade collateral by 
reallocating the default risk appropriately. 
CDOs have been at the heart of a number of disputes.  Many CDOs 
have experienced unexpectedly high default rates, which have led to  
litigation.  For example, Metropolitan West Asset Management v. 
Shenkman Capital Management, which is discussed later in the article, 
concerns a dispute over the liquidation of a CDO’s collateral, which had 
fallen in value in response to the higher default rates to the point where 
the indenture gave the senior note holders the right to direct the trustee 
to liquidate the collateral.55
                                                          
      54.   Bond ratings fall into several categories.  The ratings from highest to lowest, 
according to Moody’s Investors Service, are Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, C, and D.  
Baa and above are investment-grade, and Ba and below are speculative-grade. 
  CDO tranches are often insured by financial 
insurers, and problems with these insurance arrangements have triggered 
litigation.  For example, Merrill Lynch v. XL Capital Assurance, which 
      55.   No. 03 Civ. 5539 (NRB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17003, at *1-5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 16, 2005). 
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is discussed later in the article, is an example of a case involving CDOs 
and CDS contracts referenced to one or more of the CDO tranches that a 
securities dealer had purchased to hedge the default risk inherent in  
various CDO tranches it was holding.56
Many very complex CDOs, and in particular CDOs structured 
around subprime mortgage collateral, experienced large losses during 
2007 and 2008, which triggered lawsuits seeking recovery of investor 
losses asserting fraud and other allegations. 
 
 
III. OVERVIEW OF DERIVATIVES LITIGATION BASED ON  
THE TYPE OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS INVOLVED 
This section provides an overview of federal derivatives litigation 
since 2001.  We furnish a breakdown of the litigation between  
enforcement actions and court cases and also by type of derivative  
instrument and by type of underlying asset.  We also provide a brief  
description of some representative cases to highlight the major legal and 
financial issues raised by derivatives litigation. 
A. FREQUENCY OF LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
Exhibit 7 provides an annual breakdown of federal enforcement  
actions and litigation in the federal courts relating to derivatives between 
2001 and 2009.  The enforcement actions consist of cases initiated by 
regulatory agencies, such as the Commodities Futures Trading  
Commission (the “CFTC”), the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the “SEC”), the Department of Labor (the “DOL”), and the Justice  
Department.  The federal litigation consists mainly of cases initiated by 
private litigants. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
      56.   564 F. Supp. 2d 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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Exhibit 7 
Annual Breakdown of Litigation and Enforcement Actions 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Enforcement  
Action  2 6 5 6 7 21 15 15 13 90 
Other 11 12 8 8 13 27 12 19 38 148 
Total 13 18 13 14 20 48 27 34 51 238 
 
A total of 238 derivatives-related cases consisting of ninety  
enforcement actions and 148 private cases were filed in the U.S. courts 
between 2001 and 2009.  Enforcement actions averaged ten per year 
from 2001 to 2009.  The number increased significantly in 2006 to peak 
at twenty-one, from a yearly mean of about five between 2001 and 2005.  
Private causes of action exhibit a similar pattern until 2006, cresting at 
twenty-seven that year, falling to just twelve in 2007, but then rising 
steadily thereafter and reaching thirty-eight  in 2009.  In 2006, the  
greatest number of cases involved options on currencies or options on 
commodities, with the plaintiffs typically alleging fraud or breach of 
contract.  More recently, the greatest number of cases still involves  
options on currencies or commodities.  However, cases involving  
mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations increased 
dramatically in 2009 as a result of the mortgage-backed and  
asset-backed securities market meltdowns beginning in 2007. 
B. BREAKDOWN OF DERIVATIVES CASES BY JURISDICTION 
Exhibit 8 furnishes a breakdown of federal derivatives litigation  
between 2001 and 2009 by federal circuit. The Second Circuit, which 
includes the state of New York, had the most cases filed during the 
2001-2009 period.  Of the 238 cases, eighty-four were filed in the 
Second Circuit, which accounted for more than one-third of all cases. 
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Exhibit 8 
Annual Breakdown of Cases by Jurisdiction 
 
Circuit 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 3 
2 4 8 8 5 5 14 8 9 23 84 
3 0 0 0 1 4 5 1 3 3 17 
4 1 2 0 0 0 5 1 0 4 13 
5 0 1 0 1 4 3 3 0 3 15 
6 1 0 0 0 3 2 3 1 4 14 
7 2 1 1 3 0 1 3 5 8 24 
8 1 1 0 0 1 4 0 1 0 8 
9 1 0 2 1 1 4 5 5 4 23 
10 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 4 
11 3 5 2 3 2 7 3 6 2 33 
Total 13 18 13 14 20 48 27 34 51 238 
 
This high proportion of cases in the Second Circuit is not surprising 
because securities and derivatives contracts typically specify New York 
law, and the major securities dealers are based in New York City.  The 
Second Circuit remained the dominant jurisdiction for derivatives-
related litigation each year during the nine-year period. 
C. CASES BY TYPE OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENT 
Exhibit 9 furnishes a breakdown of derivatives cases according to 
the type of derivative instrument that is the subject of the litigation.  
Options are the most common derivative instrument referenced in cases 
filed between 2001 and 2009, accounting for 46% of all the cases.  
Futures and forwards were the next most frequently cited instruments, 
representing 24% of all the derivatives-related litigation, followed by 
swaps with 18%.  The number of options cases has remained high year 
after year.  In 2009, options-related disputes were most common with 
fifteen filings, followed by futures and forwards with thirteen and eleven 
related to swaps.  As noted earlier, the complexity of option contracts, 
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the apparent opportunity for large returns, and the lack of market prices 
for over-the-counter options combine to make these instruments ripe for 
fraud in the hands of disreputable promoters. 
Exhibit 9 
Annual Breakdown of Cases by Type of Derivative 
 
Derivative 
 Instrument 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
CDO 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 1 8 15 
Credit Default Swaps 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 6 12 
Other Swaps 1 2 4 2 2 8 2 8 5 34 
Options 6 8 4 5 13 33 15 17 15 116 
MBS  
(CMO, IO, PO, etc) 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 9 
Other Structured 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Repo 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 
Futures/Forwards 4 7 4 6 6 6 8 6 13 60 
Total 14 19 14 15 21 51 27 37 56 254 
 
The high numbers of options cases between 2005 and 2009 were 
due to a significant increase in litigation alleging fraud.  The number of 
cases alleging fraud jumped to thirty-three in 2006 from just five in the 
immediately preceding four-year period.  Most of these cases involved 
investment advisors allegedly misleading investors about the  
profitability of investment strategies utilizing options and misrepresent-
ing potential investment results.  Futures and forwards accounted for 
more derivatives cases than options between 1994 and 2000 because 
there were more cases involving commodities in that period.   
Commodities forwards and futures were involved in a high percentage 
of cases, especially CFTC enforcement actions.57
There were only twelve cases involving credit default swaps.   
However, these instruments are among the newer derivatives, and their 
use has rapidly grown.
  Between 2001 and 
2009, the mix of cases has shifted toward a higher percentage of stock 
options and currency options cases. 
58
                                                          
      57.   Finnerty & Brown, supra note 6, at 149-51. 
  There were six credit default swap cases filed 
      58.   CDS contracts were developed in the mid-1990s, which makes them newer 
than financial forwards and futures, options, and interest rate and currency swaps. 
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in 2009 alone.  The depth and severity of the current credit crisis  
suggests that the number of credit derivative cases will increase within 
the next few years. 
Exhibit 10 provides an overall breakdown of cases by derivative 
type for the nine-year period.  The current economic crisis started when 
the mortgage-backed securities market suffered a meltdown in 2007.  
Securities dealers had aggressively securitized subprime mortgages and 
so-called Alt-A mortgages, which lenders extended based on minimal 
documentation, which were thus ripe for fraud.  Many of these  
securitizations have exhibited very high default rates.59
Exhibit 10 
Overall Breakdown of Cases by Type of Derivatives 
  There were just 
nine cases involving mortgage-backed securities filed between 2001 and 
2009.  We expect that the mix of cases will shift toward CDS, CDO, and 
MBS over the next few years. 
 
D. CASES BY TYPE OF UNDERLYING ASSET 
Exhibit 11 describes the mix of derivatives cases between 2001 and 
2009 based on the type of underlying asset.60  The most frequently  
referenced underlying asset is foreign exchange, which accounted for 
31% of all the cases filed during the 2001-2009 period.  Currency  
derivatives have been the source of some high-profile disputes.61
                                                          
      59.   See Fannie Mae, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Mar. 31, 2009). 
  These 
      60.   The number of underlying instruments exceeds the number of cases reported in 
Exhibit 9 because some derivatives cases reference more than one type of underlying 
asset.   
      61.   See, e.g., De Kwiatsowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1295-97 (2d 
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cases often involve either hedges that failed to perform as expected or 
currency speculation that resulted in unexpected losses that the  
speculator sought to void. 
Ranking second, commodities were referenced in forty-nine cases, 
which represented 19% of all derivatives litigation.  Cases involving 
currencies or commodities often allege fraud, and more specifically, the 
allegation that the securities dealer or the promoter misrepresented the 
trading strategies and/or overstated his investment results when he  
solicited funds from investors.62
Exhibit 11 
Overall Breakdown of Cases by Type of Underlying 
 
 
 
 
Bonds and equities were the next most common underlying  
instrument, each accounting for 13% of all the cases filed.  Interest rates 
ranked next with 10% of the cases. 
Exhibit 12 provides a breakdown of cases by type of underlying  
asset during the nine-year period.  The number of cases referencing 
bonds was evenly spread, averaging three per year, from 2001 to 2008, 
before jumping to eleven in 2009.  Commodity and currency-related  
derivatives litigation jumped significantly to a peak in 2006 before  
tapering off in 2007 and 2008.  There were only three cases referencing 
                                                                                                                                       
Cir. 2002). 
      62.  See CHARLES W. SMITHSON, MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK: 1996 YEARBOOK, Ch. 
4 (CIBC Wood Gundy 1996); see also CHARLES W. SMITHSON, MANAGING FINANCIAL 
RISK: 1997 YEARBOOK, Ch. 4 (CIBC Wood Gundy 1997). 
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mortgages from 2001 to 2008 but the number of such cases increased to 
nine in 2009.  This trend is likely to continue over the next few years  
because of the lingering effects of the 2007 subprime mortgage debacle. 
Exhibit 12 
Annual Breakdown of Cases by Type of Underlying 
Underlying  Asset 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Bond 3 3 1 2 0 7 4 4 11 35 
Equity 3 3 1 2 2 7 7 3 7 35 
Interest Rate 1 1 1 1 2 7 2 7 3 25 
Currency 0 5 5 5 11 22 14 11 8 81 
Commodity 5 5 2 3 3 10 3 7 11 49 
Loan 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 6 
Mortgages 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 9 12 
CDO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 11 
Swaps 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Volatility 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
ABS/MBS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
Total 15 18 11 14 18 55 30 34 67 262 
 
Exhibit 13 provides a longer-term perspective on the mix of cases 
based on the relationship between the type of derivative instrument and 
the nature of the underlying asset.63
 
 
 
                                                          
      63.   See Finnerty & Brown, supra note 6, at 134-36 (overview of derivative-related 
cases between 1994 and 2000). 
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Exhibit 13 
Number of Cases by Type of Derivative and Underlying Asset:  
1994 to 2009 
 
 
Cases involving options on stocks or currencies and cases involving 
commodities forward or futures contracts occur in large numbers 
throughout the sixteen-year period.  Options are complex instruments 
that entail leverage.  When losses occur, this leverage tends to magnify 
them.  The larger losses in turn make it more likely that the aggrieved 
party will litigate if the dispute cannot be resolved amicably. 
E. REPRESENTATIVE CASES 
Numerous cases in the period 2001-2009 revolved around the use 
of foreign currency options to allegedly create illegal tax shelters.64
These structures often entailed buying and selling foreign exchange 
call options (or put options) with roughly the same strike price.  The 
  The 
typical transaction involved a bank or securities firm, a law firm, an  
accounting firm, and a wealthy individual seeking to avoid a large  
capital gains tax liability, for example, on the gain realized when shares 
of common stock of a previously closely held firm were sold in a public  
offering or a change-of-control transaction.  The tax shelter entailed 
structuring a sequence of transactions designed to manufacture a large 
loss for income tax purposes, usually by exploiting a perceived loophole 
in the partnership tax rules.  The bank or securities firm offered the  
derivative, the accounting firm structured the erstwhile tax shelter, and 
the law firm opined on the legality of the package. 
                                                          
      64.  Alan L. Tucker, Son of BOSS, 15 J. of Derivatives 74, 82-83 (2008). 
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nearly identical strike prices meant that the option holder had very little 
risk and very little opportunity for profit.  These options were transferred 
to a partnership soon after purchase.  The tax basis of the partnership 
was increased by the amount paid to purchase the long option position, 
while not accounting for the obligation associated with the short option 
position.  The partnership was subsequently dissolved, and the assets 
were distributed to the partners who reported a large capital loss for  
income tax purposes owing to their high tax basis in the partnership.  
Some of the tax structures65 that fit this general form were marketed un-
der the names BOSS (Bond and Options Sales Strategy), COBRA (Cur-
rency Options Bring Reward Alternatives), FLIP (Foreign Leveraged 
Investment Program), OPS (Option Participation Strategy), HOMER, 
BART etc.66
In a number of related cases, such as Denney v. BDO Seidman and 
Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, et al., the plaintiff taxpayers sued  
defendants Deutsche Bank, law firm Jenkens & Gilchrist, and tax and 
accounting experts BDO Seidman (“BDO”).
 
67  The tax strategy was  
developed by Jenkens & Gilchrist, and BDO marketed it to high-net-
worth individuals.  Jenkens & Gilchrist wrote the legal opinions  
asserting the legality of the tax shelter.68  Plaintiffs opened accounts 
with Deutsche Bank to execute the option transactions based on BDO’s  
recommendation, Deutsche Bank’s assurances regarding the strategy, 
and Jenkens & Gilchrist’s tax opinion.69
In August 2000, the IRS published a notice stating that the COBRA 
structure was illegal because it lacked economic substance and warning 
that it had previously taken the position that similar tax shelters were not 
valid in another circular issued in December 1999.
 
70  Nonetheless,  
Jenkens & Gilchrist apparently continued to vouch for the legality of 
such deals.71
                                                          
      65.   See The Johnson Law Firm, Tax Shelter Abuse: Complaints and Lawsuits, 
http://www.taxsheltervictimslawfirm.com/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (discussing  
various forms of tax shelters). 
  The plaintiffs used the COBRA strategy to reduce their  
      66.   See Tax-News.com, Leroy Baker, Tax Shelter Probe Sinks Esteemed US Law 
Firm, http://www.tax-news.com/archive/story/Tax_Shelter_Probe_Sinks_Esteemed_US 
_Law_Firm_xxxx26854.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
     67.   Denney v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 412 F. 3d 58 (2d Cir. 2005); Denney v.  
Jenkins & Gilchrist, 412 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
     68.   BDO Seidman, 412 F.3d 58. 
     69.   Id. 
     70.   Id. 
     71.   Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 340 F. Supp. 2d 338, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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income taxes for 1999, 2000 and 2001.72  Upon receiving notices from 
both the New York State Revenue Department and the IRS stating that 
their income tax returns had been selected for audit, the plaintiffs sued 
the defendants alleging several violations of the law, including unjust 
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duties, and negligent misrepresenta-
tion.73
Plaintiffs had allegedly entered into a consulting agreement with 
BDO to participate in the COBRA tax arrangement.
 
74  The district court 
held that the consulting agreement was just a “trick” to prevent the other 
parties from understanding the true nature of the relationship between 
the plaintiffs and BDO, and therefore was mutually fraudulent and 
void.75  However, the court of appeals overturned the district court’s  
decision that the contracts were mutually fraudulent.76
Numerous other cases involved commodity futures or forward  
contracts.  For example, Olympic Natural Gas Co. v. Morgan Stanley 
Capital Group, Inc. is a commodities dispute concerning settlement 
payments owed under natural gas contracts by a firm that filed for  
bankruptcy protection.
 
77
There were two crucial issues before the court.
  The bankruptcy trustee sought avoidance of 
payments made by the Olympic Natural Gas Co. and Olympic Gas  
Marketing, Inc. (collectively, “Olympic”) to Morgan Stanley Capital 
Group (“Morgan Stanley”).  The trustee alleged that the payments could 
be avoided as preferential or fraudulent transfers.  Morgan Stanley  
argued that the contracts in question were forward contracts, that the 
monies Olympic owed were “settlement payments” which it made to 
Morgan Stanley acting as a forward contract merchant, and that the 
payments were therefore exempt from avoidance attack. 
78
                                                          
     72.   Id. at 342-43. 
  First, was Morgan 
Stanley a forward contract merchant?  To settle that question, it was  
necessary to determine whether the contracts Olympic had entered into 
with Morgan Stanley were forward contracts.  Second, it was necessary 
     73.   See id. at 340, 342. 
     74.   BDO Seidman, 412 F.3d at 61-62 (citing Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 340 F. 
Supp. 2d 338, 341 & 343-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).  However, the BDO consulting agree-
ment did not mention the COBRA strategy by name.  412 F. Supp. 2d at 301 & n.49. 
     75.   BDO Seidman, 412 F.3d at 63 (citing Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 340 F. 
Supp. 2d 338, 346-47 & n.9). 
     76.   Id. at 60-61. 
     77.  In re Olympic Nat. Gas Co. v. Morgan Stanley Capital Group, 294 F.3d 737, 
739-40 (5th Cir. 2002). 
      78.   Id. at 740. 
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to determine whether the cash transfers were settlement payments under 
these contracts. 
The disputed contracts outlined the terms of sales and purchases of 
natural gas between Olympic and Morgan Stanley.  Each month the 
counterparties entered into a number of transactions with a single  
settlement date.  The trustee claimed that the bankruptcy code divided 
the commodity world into three parts: (1) exchange-traded futures  
contracts; (2) off-exchange over-the-counter forwards; and (3) ordinary 
commodity contracts (commercial contracts for the supply of goods with 
a future delivery date).79  The trustee alleged that Olympic’s agreements 
with Morgan Stanley fell into the third category.80  Morgan Stanley  
argued that the last two categories are the same and that the disputed 
contracts are forward contracts.81
The bankruptcy court and the district court sided with Morgan  
Stanley in determining that the commodity world was divided only into  
exchange-traded and over-the-counter markets and that the contracts in 
question were indeed valid forward contracts.
 
82  The courts ruled that 
Morgan Stanley was acting as a forward contract merchant when it  
entered into the disputed contracts and that the transfers in question were 
covered by the definition of settlement payments to close a forward  
contract.  The appellate court upheld these rulings.  Therefore,  
Olympic’s payments to Morgan Stanley could not be avoided under the 
bankruptcy code.83
 
 
VI. CREDIT DERIVATIVES CASES 
This section discusses recent noteworthy credit derivatives cases.  
We believe that the current economic crisis is likely to spawn significant 
credit derivatives litigation because the credit market meltdown exposed 
flaws in many of these instruments and generated large losses that are 
likely to lead to litigation. 
 
                                                          
      79.   Id. 
      80.   Id. 
      81.   See id. at 740-41. 
      82.   Id. at 739-40. 
      83.   Id. at 742. 
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A. NATURE OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES CASES 
Credit derivatives cases have assumed some prominence in the  
context of the current economic crisis.  This crisis is due, at least in part, 
to a substantial recalibration of credit risk by capital market participants.  
CDS played a central role in this process.  The CDS market grew rapidly 
beginning in 2000.  The notional value outstanding of CDS contracts 
was U.S. $57.4 trillion at the end of June 2008.84
As reported in Exhibit 9, a total of twenty-seven credit-related de-
rivatives cases, fifteen involving CDOs and twelve involving CDS, were 
filed in the federal courts between 2001 and 2009.  Due to the steep 
losses  
experienced by many CDO investors, an increase in litigation alleging 
misrepresentation of CDO investment risks can be expected in the  
future. 
  Similarly, CDO  
issuance expanded on the premise that it helped to better match issuance 
with investor risk tolerances. 
B. REPRESENTATIVE CREDIT DERIVATIVES CASES 
Hoosier Energy Rural Electricity Cooperative v. John Hancock Life 
Insurance Company is a complex dispute involving CDS contracts that 
resulted directly from the current credit crisis.85  In 2002, plaintiff 
Hoosier Energy entered into a sale-in-lease-out (“SILO”) transaction  
involving an electric generating plant.86  Hoosier Energy leased certain 
assets at its Merom power plant to John Hancock Life Insurance (“John 
Hancock”) for a term of sixty-three years (which exceeded their useful 
life) in return for a one-time payment of $300 million.87
                                                          
     84.   Bank for Int'l Settlements, Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter (OTC) 
Derivatives, BIS Q. REV. at A103 tbl. 19 (Dec. 2009) (statistical annex), available at 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf. 
  John Hancock 
immediately leased these assets back to Hoosier Energy for a term of 
thirty years in return for periodic lease payments.  Hoosier Energy  
retained close to $20 million of the money received for the initial lease-
out and deposited $278 million with various Ambac entities, which 
committed to make regular lease payments on Hoosier Energy’s behalf 
     85.   See Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 588 F. 
Supp. 2d 919 (S.D. Ind. 2008). 
     86.   Id. at 922. 
     87.   Id. 
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to John Hancock.88
The SILO transaction was designed to allow John Hancock to claim 
to be the “owner” of the plant for tax purposes.
 
89  John Hancock would 
then be able to claim tens of millions of dollars of tax deductions, which 
Hoosier Energy could not use, because as an electricity cooperative, it 
operated near break-even in selling electricity to its members.  However, 
Hoosier Energy made additional payments to Ambac entities, which 
made it virtually certain that Hoosier Energy would retain control of the 
Merom plant.90  The IRS had begun disallowing income tax deductions 
to participants in SILO transactions around the time of the Hoosier 
Energy transaction.91  The transaction allegedly lacked economic  
substance because Hoosier Energy would remain in control of the plant, 
and John Hancock would not have the rights, risks, and responsibilities 
normally associated with asset ownership.92
As a part of the transaction, Hoosier Energy was required to  
provide John Hancock with a CDS contract from Ambac to provide  
further assurances of timely lease payments.  The CDS was intended to 
protect John Hancock if Hoosier Energy defaulted under the lease.  If 
Hoosier Energy defaulted, John Hancock could demand a termination 
payment from Ambac.  Ambac, in turn, purchased a closely matching 
CDS from Hoosier Energy, which would pay off if Hoosier Energy  
defaulted under the lease.
 
93
John Hancock sought further protection by requiring that the party 
providing the CDS should have a credit rating no lower than “AA”.  
Consequently, if Ambac’s rating dropped below “AA”, then Hoosier 
Energy was obligated to replace Ambac with another insurer satisfying 
the “AA” requirement within sixty days.  If Hoosier Energy failed to so, 
John Hancock could declare an event of default and demand the  
termination payment from Ambac, and Ambac could demand a  
substantial payment from Hoosier Energy under the CDS.  This  
compensation would amount to approximately $121 million, as of the 
end of November 2008.
 
94
                                                          
      88.   Id. 
 
      89.   Id. 
      90.   Id. 
      91.   Id. at 923. 
      92.   See id. at 924, 927-28. 
      93.   Id. at 922. 
      94.   Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 1:08-cv-
1560-DFH-DML, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100353, at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 11, 2008). 
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Global credit woes, and in particular, the subprime mortgage crisis, 
drove Ambac’s credit rating down to “Aa3” in June 2008.95  The credit 
crisis apparently made it impossible for Hoosier Energy to find a  
replacement for Ambac within the required sixty days.96  Following a 
fifty-day extension, Hoosier Energy had lined up a replacement for  
Ambac but required an additional ninety days to close the transaction.97  
John Hancock refused to grant any further extension, declared an event 
of default, and demanded a $120 million termination payment from 
Ambac.98
The termination payment by Ambac to John Hancock would have 
resulted in a similar obligation for Hoosier Energy, forcing it into  
bankruptcy.
 
99  The district court concluded that the bankruptcy filing 
would likely cause severe irreparable harm to Hoosier Energy.100  In  
addition, the court found that Hoosier Energy had a meritorious  
argument that the CDS contracts were part of an allegedly abusive and 
essentially illegal SILO transaction that was devoid of any economic 
substance.101  Last but not least, in the wake of the extraordinary credit 
crisis, the court also found that it was reasonably likely that Hoosier 
Energy would be able to assert temporary commercial impracticability 
with respect to its obligation to arrange for another CDS counterparty 
that met the “AA” threshold within the pre-agreed time interval, and that 
it should be entitled to more time.102  Based on these facts, the district 
court granted Hoosier Energy’s motion for a preliminary injunction to 
enjoin John Hancock and Ambac from asserting an event of default and 
demanding any termination payments.103
Merrill Lynch v. XL Capital Assurance is a case in which one credit 
derivative (a CDS) referenced another credit derivative (a CDO),  
highlighting the sort of complexities that are at the heart of the current 
problems plaguing the credit markets.
 
104
                                                          
     95.   See Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., 588 F. Supp. 2d at 924. 
  Plaintiff, Merrill Lynch  
     96.   By June 2008, only three of the thirteen financial guarantors tracked by  
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s had a rating of “AA” or better. Hoosier Energy Rural 
Elec. Coop,. LEXIS 100353, at *9. 
     97.   Id. at *11-*12. 
     98.   Id. at *3. 
     99.   Id. at *13-*16. 
    100.  Id. at *13. 
    101.  Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., 588 F. Supp. 2d at 926-28. 
    102.  Id. at 930-32. 
    103.  Id. at 935. 
    104.  Merrill Lynch Int'l v. XL Capital Assurance, 564 F. Supp. 2d 298 (S.D.N.Y. 
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International (“MLI”), sued the bond insurer XL Capital Assurance Inc. 
(“XLCA”) to enforce seven credit default swaps with a notional amount 
of about $ 3.1 billion.  The reference obligations for these swaps were 
seven CDOs. 
MLI owned both the A-1 and A-2 “super senior” tranches of the 
CDOs in question, but purchased insurance from XLCA only on the A-2 
tranche.105  In general, the seller of protection in the CDS gets voting 
rights only on the insured tranche, but in this case, XLCA obtained  
exclusive “controlling class” rights on both tranches.106  Subsequently, 
MLI bought another CDS referencing the A-1 tranche of the same 
CDOs.  Subsequently, MLI bought six additional CDSs referencing the 
same A-1 notes of six of the seven CDOs that were referenced in the 
XCLA swaps.107  XLCA learned that S&P listed MBIA as the bond  
insurance provider for the six CDOs and that MBIA had instructed MLI 
how to exercise certain Class A-1voting rights for the six CDOs.  Based 
on this information, XLCA decided to terminate the swaps alleging that 
MLI had anticipatorily breached, or repudiated, six of the contracts by 
entering into CDSs with another guarantor referencing the same 
CDOs.108  Additionally, XLCA tried to terminate a seventh CDS  
because MLI had allegedly failed to adequately assure XLCA of its  
intent to perform under this CDS contract.109
The district court found that the contractual language qualified 
MLI’s requirement to obey MBIA’s directions where these directions 
might conflict with meeting its obligations under the XLCA swap 
agreements.
 
110  Thus, XLCA was not justified in terminating the six 
CDSs where MBIA was also an insurer.  Also, the court found that 
XLCA’s concerns about MLI’s possible nonperformance on the seventh 
swap were not valid because they were premised on an incorrect  
interpretation of MLI’s conduct on the other six CDS transactions.111
                                                                                                                                       
2008). 
   
     105.   Id. at 300. 
     106.   Id. 
     107.   Id. at 301. 
     108.   Id.  In general, the most senior class of CDO notes is the “controlling class.”  
It has the right to direct the CDO trustee to institute legal proceedings, and in the event 
of default, to terminate the collateral manager, accelerate note maturities, and order the 
liquidation of the trust’s collateral. 
     109.   Id. at 302.  
     110.   Id. at 304. 
     111.   Id. at 306. 
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Consequently, the court ruled that XLCA’s termination notices did not 
have any legal basis, and the CDS contracts remained in effect.112
 
 
V. DERIVATIVES CASES BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE ALLEGATIONS 
This section provides a breakdown of derivatives actions based on 
the nature of the allegations.  We also describe some of the more  
noteworthy cases. 
A. DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BY TYPE OF ALLEGATION 
Exhibit 14 shows the annual breakdown of derivatives-related  
litigation based on the nature of the allegations.  Fraud, including  
securities fraud, was the prime allegation in derivatives litigation  
between 2001 and 2009.  Fraud was alleged in 138 cases.  Breach of 
contract was the next most frequent allegation; it was alleged in sixty-
five instances.  The percentage of cases alleging fraud peaked at 80% in 
2007, while the percentage alleging breach of contract reached a peak of 
35% in 2002.  Of course, many complaints involve multiple allegations.  
The bulk of the options and futures cases surveyed involve alleged fraud 
by investment advisors who were soliciting investments on the basis of 
misrepresentations involving derivatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
     112.   Id.  
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Exhibit 14 
Annual Breakdown of Cases by Type of Allegation 
Allegation 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Fraud 6 8 6 4 7 24 17 16 15 103 
Securities Fraud 4 1 2 3 2 5 3 3 12 35 
Civil Conspiracy 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 3 2 11 
Breach of Contract 4 7 3 3 4 16 3 6 19 65 
Breach of  
Fiduciary Duty 1 2 1 0 4 2 1 5 14 30 
Good faith and  
Fair Dealing 0 1 0 0 2 5 0 1 3 12 
Unjust Enrichment 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 1 7 14 
Negligent  
Misrepresentation 0 1 0 0 4 2 0 3 8 18 
Negligence 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 4 8 
Illegal Tax Shelter 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 8 
Total 15 20 12 10 32 60 25 42 88 304 
 
The high percentage of fraud cases is not surprising because  
derivatives instruments are complex, and unscrupulous promoters often 
misrepresent their capabilities to induce investors into entering into 
transactions.  This complexity facilitates their misuse because investors 
would be less likely to accept the misrepresentations if the contracts 
were simpler and therefore more easily understood. 
Exhibit 15 provides an overall breakdown of derivatives-related 
cases during the nine-year period based on the type of allegation.  Fraud, 
at least partly, accounts for 34% of the cases and a total of 45% when 
securities fraud is included.  Breach of contract at least partly accounts 
for 21%.  The interest rate-swap and credit derivative disputes during 
this period were dominated by alleged breach of contract and other  
contractual issues, such as disagreements about the interpretation of  
covenants (Metropolitan West Asset Management v. Shenkman Capital 
Management, which is detailed later in the article113) and disputes  
regarding termination payments (Hoosier Energy Rural Electricity Co-
operative v. John Hancock Life Insurance Company,114
                                                          
      113.   2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17003 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 which was  
      114.   No. 1:08-cv-1560-DFH-DML, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100353 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 
11, 2008). 
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discussed earlier in the article, and  In re: Plastech Engineered Prod-
ucts, Inc.,115
Exhibit 15 
Overall Breakdown of Cases by Type of Allegation 
 which is detailed later in the article).  Payment disputes  
under interest rate swap contracts are often framed as breach of contract 
cases in which one party disputes the other party’s payment calculation. 
 
B. THE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME 
The Madoff scandal provides a current example of how promoters 
can invoke supposedly sophisticated options strategies to carry out a 
fraudulent investment scheme.  Bernard Madoff allegedly achieved  
stellar investment performance by utilizing a sophisticated “split-strike 
conversion strategy.” 116  This performance has been revealed to be  
nothing more than a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme.  His largest fund 
reported consistently high returns with incredibly low volatility over 
nearly two decades, which he attributed to his strategy of coupling an 
investment in large cap stocks with the purchase and sale of S&P 100 
Index options.117
                                                          
      115.   399 B.R. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008). 
  This “split-strike conversion strategy” investment 
scheme involved (a) buying a portfolio of common stocks that were 
supposed to replicate the performance of the S&P 100 Index plus (b) 
buying out-of-the-money S&P 100 Index put options plus (c) selling 
     116.   Bernard & Boyle, supra note 7, at 2.  See also Stephen Gandel, Wall Street’s 
Latest Downfall: Madoff Charged with Fraud, TIME, Dec. 12, 2008, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1866154,00.html. 
     117.   Gandel, supra note 116, at 2-3. 
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out-of-the-money S&P 100 Index call options.118  The put options are 
supposed to protect the equity portfolio against downside risk.  The 
premium received from selling the call options is designed to pay for the 
put options.  Together they constitute a collar; however, referring to the 
strategy as a “split-strike conversion strategy” sounds more sophisticated 
than simply calling it a collar.  As with any equity collar, the investor 
forgoes some of the upside (above the call option’s strike price) to  
eliminate some of the downside (below the put option’s strike price).  
While this strategy will certainly decrease volatility as compared to a 
strict buy-and-hold equity scheme, the rates of return claimed by  
Madoff’s funds were improbably stable.119
Exhibit 16 shows that one dollar invested in December 1990 with 
the Fairfield Sentry Ltd. hedge fund, which was one of Madoff’s largest 
feeder funds, would have grown almost linearly to about six dollars by 
October 2008.  Fairfield Sentry claimed an average annual return of 
10.59% between December 1990 and October 2008 with a standard  
deviation of just 2.45%.
 
120  This performance compares with a 9.64% 
average annual return and a 14.28% standard deviation of the S&P 500 
during the same period.121  Investment managers calculate the Sharpe  
ratio to express a portfolio’s rate of return in relation to the portfolio’s 
risk.  It equals the difference between the portfolio’s rate of return and 
the return of a risk-free investment (i.e., the portion of the total return 
that compensates for the portfolio’s risk) divided by the standard  
deviation of the portfolio’s return (i.e., the portfolio’s risk).122
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
     118.   Bernard & Boyle, supra note 7, at 2-3. 
     119.   Id. at 3, 10. 
     120.   Id. at 3. 
     121.   Id. at 4. 
     122.   William Sharpe, The Sharpe Ratio, J. of PORTFOLIO MGMT., 1994, at 49-58.  
The standard deviation of a portfolio’s rate of return is a standard measure of portfolio 
risk in the investment management field. 
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Exhibit 16 
Value of $1 Invested in Fairfield Sentry: Dec. 1990 to Oct. 2008 
 
Source: Bernard and Boyle (2009)123
 
 
The higher the Sharpe ratio, the better is the strategy’s rate of return 
in relation to its risk.  Simulation results from strategies similar to those 
purportedly employed by Madoff run on data for the S&P from  
December 1990 to October 2008 indicate a best case annual Sharpe  
Ratio of 0.326 as compared to the 2.47 Sharpe Ratio claimed by  
Fairfield Sentry.124
In other words, Fairfield claimed a Sharpe Ratio for Madoff’s  
strategy that was nearly eight times what could reasonably be expected.  
The returns Fairfield Sentry reported for Madoff’s strategy implied a  
beta for the strategy of 0.06 and a correlation with the S&P 100 Index of 
only 0.3, both of which are improbably low.
 
125
The obvious question is how could such a giant scheme continue 
for so long without detection?  Apparently, there were several  
investment professionals whose warnings that the scheme was a massive 
fraud went unheeded.
 
126
                                                          
      123.   Bernard & Boyle, supra note 7, at 18-19. 
  In view of the improbability of achieving the 
      124.   Id. at 7. 
      125.   Id. The Fairfield Sentry Ltd. hedge fund was one of the larger feeder funds for 
the Madoff funds.  
      126.  Gregory Zuckerman, Fees, Even Returns and Auditors All Raised Flags, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2008, at A7.  
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claimed returns, there certainly appears to have been a regulatory failure.  
In addition, we think that Madoff’s wrapping the investment strategy in 
the cloak of a “nontraditional options strategy” gave it an aura of  
sophistication, which together with the apparently stable high rates of 
return, blinded investors to the possibility that it was all a sham. 
C. REPRESENTATIVE CASES 
CSX v. Children’s Investment Fund Management concerns the use 
of equity total return swaps by The Children’s Investment Management 
Fund (“TCI”), 3G Fund L.P., and 3G Capital Partners L.P. (“3G”) to 
create synthetic securities.127  They allegedly did this to evade the  
reporting requirements of § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.128  CSX sued the defendants alleging a failure to file a 13(d) 
statement in a timely manner disclosing the formation of a group of  
investors whom it alleged had acted in concert to accumulate a large  
position in CSX common shares.129  Additionally, the complaint alleged 
that the proxy statement did not disclose the group’s beneficial  
ownership of shares referenced in the total return swaps.130
TCI and 3G reportedly considered CSX to be poorly managed and 
sought to profit from buying the company’s equity and improving  
returns through shareholder activism.
 
131  Under the Williams Act, any 
accumulation of shares above 5% of the shares outstanding and/or the 
formation of groups for that purpose needs to be disclosed to the firm’s 
shareholders.132  TCI and 3G filed a proxy statement disclosing the  
formation of a group and reiterating their intention to propose nominees 
for election to the CSX board.133
                                                          
      127.   562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 521-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
  The group disclosed that it collectively 
held 8.7% of the shares outstanding and also that it had additional  
economic exposure to CSX common equity through total return swaps 
tied to the return on CSX stock.  Under the swaps, TCI and 3G would 
make payments based on the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and 
      128.   Id. at 552. 
      129.   Id. at 538. 
      130.   CSX Corp., Information to Be Included in Statement Filed pursuant to Rule 
13d-1(a) and Amendments thereto Filed pursuant to Rule 13d-2(a) (Form SC 13D), at 
15, 17 (Dec. 19, 2007). 
      131.   CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 523, 530. 
      132.   Id. at 538. 
      133.   CSX Corp., supra note 130, at 14-15. 
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receive payments based on the dividends plus price appreciation minus 
price depreciation on a specified number of shares of CSX common 
stock.  Deutsche Bank, the swap counterparty, had beneficial ownership 
of shares that was also disclosed in the proxy.134
The district court observed that while total return swaps do not  
directly confer beneficial ownership of the underlying assets (CSX 
common stock), it was evident that TCI had used the derivative contracts 
to avoid vesting of beneficial ownership and to evade the reporting  
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act.
 
135  In addition, the court 
concluded that the group knew that the investment banks that were the 
counterparties to the total return swaps would buy the underlying CSX 
shares to hedge their derivative positions.  Thus, the court considered 
TCI to be the beneficial owner of the CSX shares bought by the swap 
counterparties.  TCI and 3G would receive the benefit of any  
appreciation in CSX’s stock price through the total return swaps, as 
though they had borrowed funds at LIBOR and purchased the shares  
directly.  The court also found that TCI and 3G had formed a group  
earlier than they had disclosed.  This ruling was based on the court’s  
determination that group formation had to be viewed in the context of 
either a formal or an informal agreement to act together to further a 
common objective.136
In Caiola v. Citibank, Caiola, who was an equity trading client of 
Citibank, alleged securities fraud.
 
137  Caiola started trading equities in 
the mid-1980s through Citibank Private Bank (“Citibank”).  He mainly 
traded Philip Morris (“PM”) common stock.  His PM stock positions ran 
into hundreds of thousands of shares and many millions of dollars, and 
he became one of Citibank’s largest customers.138  Caiola used put and 
call options to create collars to hedge the price risks of his stock  
holdings.  The size of his trades grew to a level where the execution of 
physical transactions in PM stock and options could impact market  
prices and reveal his trading strategy to the market.  To solve this  
problem, Citibank proposed synthetic positions in shares and options to 
Caiola in the form of equity swaps and cash-settled over-the-counter  
options, respectively.139
                                                          
      134.   CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 537. 
  On Citibank’s advice, Caiola started trading  
      135.   Id. at 517, 552. 
      136.   Id. at 543, 552-53. 
      137.   295 F.3d 312, 312 (2d Cir. 2002). 
      138.   Id. at 315. 
      139.   Id. at 315-16. 
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total return swaps, which were coupled with synthetic options to limit 
the trading risks.140  Citibank promised Caiola that it would control its 
own risks by delta hedging its net exposure to the synthetic equity and 
options positions.141  Hedging in this manner would be much cheaper 
and have less market impact than executing physical trades for Caiola in 
the physical market.142
After Citibank’s parent merged with Travelers Group, Inc.,  
Salomon Smith Barney (“SSB”) became involved in Caiola’s synthetic 
trading.  Caiola explained to Citibank that he wanted to continue his  
current relationship with Citibank and that he did not want to become a 
client of SSB.
 
143  He received assurances that his synthetic trading 
would not be impacted by SSB’s involvement.  However, starting in 
November 1998, without disclosing what it had done to Caiola, Citibank 
converted his portfolio from synthetic trading to physical trading, which 
involved purchasing the PM stock for Caiola’s account.144  In March 
1999, SSB finally told Caiola that it was unwilling to bear the risks 
emanating from synthetic trading.145
Caiola discovered that Citibank had secretly and unilaterally 
switched from synthetic transactions coupled with delta hedging to 
simply executing massive physical trades for Caiola’s account as early 
as November 1998.
 
146  As a result, Caiola then realized that he actually 
owned hundreds of thousands of shares of PM stock, which were  
unhedged and declining in value and which SSB was selling on his  
behalf.147
The district court ruled that Caiola’s synthetic transactions were not 
“securities” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and dismissed 
  He wrote options to try to recoup his losses and to profit from 
an anticipated eventual rebound in the share price.  He alleged that this 
strategy failed because Citibank unilaterally terminated the synthetic 
trading, which cost him millions of dollars. 
                                                          
      140.   Id. at 316-17.  Caiola’s transactions were structured as “paired equity swaps,” 
which ensured that his synthetic option positions would always hedge his equity swaps.  
This approach also simplified the dealer’s hedging strategies as compared to duplicating 
Caiola’s stock and option positions in the physical market because Citibank only had to 
hedge its net risk exposure. 
      141.   Id. at 317. 
      142.   See id. at 315-16. 
      143.   Id. at 318. 
      144.   Id. 
      145.   Id. at 319. 
      146.   Id. 
      147.   Id. 
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the lawsuit because the plaintiff was therefore not the purchaser or seller 
of securities.148  The appellate court overturned the district court’s  
ruling.149  It found that Caiola’s cash-settled over-the-counter options 
were “securities.” 150  It also found that Caiola had successfully pled  
securities fraud, ruling that once Citibank discussed its hedging strategy 
with Caiola, it had a duty to disclose it completely and accurately.151
The appellate decision is noteworthy because it applies the  
economic reality doctrine to test whether a financial instrument is a  
security.
 
152  The Supreme Court has stated that “in searching for the 
meaning and scope of the word ‘security’ . . . the emphasis should be on 
economic reality.”153  The definition of security is interpreted so as to 
“meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the 
use of the money of others on the promise of profits.”154  The economic 
reality approach “permits the SEC and the courts sufficient flexibility to 
ensure that those who market investments are not able to escape the  
coverage of the Securities Acts by creating new instruments that would 
not be covered by a more determinate definition.”155
Lehman Brothers Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals International 
Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co. concerns a dispute involving foreign 
currency trading, interest rate swaps, and Thai baht-denominated  
negotiable certificates of deposit (“CDs”).
 
156
                                                          
      148.   Id. at 319-20. 
  Lehman Brothers sued 
Minmetals International Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Company and its 
parent China National Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corporation 
(collectively, “Minmetals”) for breach of contract.  Minmetals filed  
several counterclaims, including fraud, negligence, negligent misrepre-
      149.   Id. at 331. 
      150.   Options have been covered under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 since the 1934 Act was amended in 1982.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982).  This provision covers 
both exchange-traded options and over-the-counter options.  The appellate court also 
found that equity swaps are securities and are covered under Rule 10b-5 as a result of 
the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000’s (CFMA) amendments to section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in December 2000.  Commodities Futures 
Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
      151.   Caiola, 295 F. 3d at 331. 
      152.   See id. at 325. 
      153.   United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975). 
      154.   SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). 
      155.   Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990). 
      156.   179 F. Supp. 2d 159 (S.D.N.Y 2001) [hereinafter Lehman Bros. 2001]. 
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sentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.157
Hu Xiangdong (“Hu”), an employee of Minmetals, conducted cash 
and derivatives trading with Lehman on margin.  He lost substantial 
amounts on foreign exchange trading and swap transactions in the wake 
of steep rate hikes by the Fed in 1994.
 
158  Lehman issued margin calls 
totaling more than $46 million.  Hu agreed to a schedule of installment 
payments to meet the margin calls.  Lehman received just one payment 
before Hu reneged on the rest of his commitments.  Unable to reach Hu, 
Lehman contacted his boss, Cao Yongfang, who informed Lehman that 
the trading positions were unauthorized and refused to pay the amount 
due.159  According to Minmetals, state-owned companies in China 
needed permission from the State Administration for Exchange Control 
(“SAEC”) to conduct foreign exchange trading and swap trading.   
Minmetals did not possess such a license and therefore, the contracts 
were supposedly illegal under Chinese law.160
The district court determined that it would follow and enforce the 
choice of law selection in the contractual documents. 
  Lehman claimed that 
Chinese law was irrelevant since the parties had chosen Delaware law as 
the governing law under the terms of the contract. 
161  The district 
court found that the transactions indeed transcended public policy  
boundaries in China and ruled that New York law does not ignore  
illegality in China.162
The court also determined that the defendant’s securities fraud 
claims relating to the interest rate swaps were not valid because these  
instruments are not securities under federal securities law.  Additionally, 
the court held that the foreign exchange trades also did not qualify as  
  Enforceability based on New York law boiled 
down to the question of whether Lehman was aware of the illegality  
under Chinese law and whether the choice-of-law provision was chosen 
to circumvent Chinese legal restrictions.  Clearly, if Lehman had  
knowledge of Chinese laws, it would have been mindful of the fact that 
formal authorization was not possible for illegal acts.  The court  
determined that whether Lehman chose the governing law to circumvent 
Chinese laws was a question of fact for a jury trial. 
                                                          
      157.   Id. at 162. 
      158.  Lehman Bros. Commer. Corp. v. Minmetals Int'l Non-Ferrous Metals  
Trading Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 118, 132 (S.D.N.Y 2000). 
      159.   Id.  Hu confessed all of his unauthorized trading to Cao in July 1994. 
      160.   Id. at 139. 
      161.   Id. at 138. 
      162.   Id. 
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securities under § 10(b) and that the fraud claims with reference to those 
transactions were not cognizable under state law.163  Finally, the court 
found that negotiable CDs are securities164 and that Lehman had failed 
to disclose the sizable risks inherent in the CDs before the trades  
occurred.165  It ruled that whether securities fraud had occurred was a 
question of fact for a jury trial.166
R.A. Mackie & Co. et al. v. PetroCorp Inc. is a breach of contract 
dispute between warrant holders of Southern Mineral Corporation 
(“Southern Mineral”) and PetroCorp Inc. (“PC”), the corporate acquirer 
of Southern Mineral.
 
167  Purchasers of Southern Mineral’s Series B  
Perpetual Warrants brought suit against PC, as successor in interest,  
alleging breach of, and tortious interference with, the warrant agreement.  
They argued that the warrants were “perpetual” by their terms.168  Under 
the terms of the merger agreement, warrant holders could receive the 
same merger consideration given to all other Southern Mineral  
shareholders only if they exercised their warrants for Southern Mineral’s 
stock prior to the merger closing date.  Otherwise, the warrants would be 
redeemable for fifty cents each, which represents the amount by which 
Southern Mineral’s stock price in the merger ($4.71) exceeded the  
warrant’s exercise price ($4.21).  Both alternatives conflicted with the 
perpetual nature of the warrants, and the plaintiffs claimed that the  
implied forced redemption breached the contract terms of the warrants 
by depriving them of the warrants’ remaining time value.169
One of the conditions in the merger agreement was that 85% of the 
outstanding warrants had to be exercised prior to the merger since PC 
was not keen to inherit these potentially dilutive instruments.  PC  
proposed a merger structure that would ensure that no warrants would 
 
                                                          
      163.   Lehman Bros. 2001, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 168. 
      164.   Id. at 163-65.   The court applied the three-part Howey test, which is the  
classic test for determining whether an agreement is an “investment contract” within the 
meaning of the Securities Acts.  See All Seasons Resorts v. Abrams, 68 N.Y. 2d 81, 497 
N.E.2d 33, 39 506 N.Y.S. 2d 10 (N.Y. 1986).  The import of this ruling is that fully  
insured conventional CDs are not securities but negotiable CDs that have “gaps” in the 
protection afforded by bank regulations are securities. 
      165.   Lehman Bros. 2001, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 168. 
      166.   Id. 
      167.   329 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
      168.   Id. at 482 (finding that the warrants could not be called, redeemed, or  
extinguished; perpetual warrants are very unusual; warrants almost always have a fixed 
expiration date). 
      169.   Id. at 501-02. 
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remain outstanding following the merger.170  Warrant holders contended 
that Southern Mineral knew of the perpetual nature of the contract but 
still went ahead with PC’s demands in order to accomplish the  
merger.171
The district court ruled that PC did not uphold the warrant holders’ 
right to convert their warrants into the merger consideration at the time 
of their choice and that the successor therefore interfered with their 
rights under the agreement.
 
172  It found that the perpetual nature of the 
warrants was breached by the Merger Agreement because the merger 
was structured to extinguish the warrants and that the warrant holders 
had their remaining time value taken away.173  The court granted the 
plaintiff damages based on the fair value of the warrants calculated by 
applying the Black-Scholes-Merton model.174  The court favored the 
model price over the market price for the warrants in holding that the 
prevailing market price was artificially depressed after the merger  
announcement on December 22, 2000 due to the news that the warrants 
would only be exchangeable for fifty cents each after the merger.175
In Metropolitan West Asset Management v. Shenkman Capital 
Management, Metropolitan West Asset Management (“MWAC”), a 
subordinated note holder, sued Shenkman Capital Management 
(“SCM”), the investment manager, and the trustee JPMorgan Chase 
(“JPMC”) alleging breach of contract and gross negligence when the 
trustee of a collateralized bond obligation (CBO) investment fund 
(“Fund”) liquidated a pool of high-yield bonds.
 
176
                                                          
      170.   Id. at 491. 
  The dispute focused 
on the allegedly improper sale of certain distressed securities, which  
lowered the collateral ratios of the Fund.  Sometime after the sale, the 
holders of the Class A Notes, the most senior class, voted to liquidate 
the Fund in May 2003.  The entire proceeds of the sale went to the Class 
A Note owners.  The plaintiff contended that since the sales of the  
distressed securities did not comply with the indenture, the subsequent 
liquidation without the consent of the subordinated note holders was  
      171.   Id. at 504. 
      172.   Id. at 509. 
      173.   Id. at 501-02. 
      174.  Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate  
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973); Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option 
Pricing, 4 BELL J. OF ECON. AND MGMT. SCI. 141 (1973). 
      175.   Mackie, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 512-13. 
      176.   2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17003 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2005). 
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improper.177
The Fund started operation by issuing Class A, Class B, Class C, 
and Income Notes.  The cash from the note offering was to be used to 
buy the collateral consisting largely of high yield and emerging market 
debt.
 
178  Subject to certain conditions, the indenture permitted and/or  
required SCM and JPMC to sell collateral considered “Credit Risk  
Securities,” “Defaulted Securities,” and “Equity Securities.”179  SCM 
could direct JPMC to release from the lien and sell any Defaulted  
Security, Equity Security, or Credit Risk Security.180  A Credit Risk  
Security (“CRS”) was defined as one that “in the Investment Manager’s 
sole judgment, has a significant risk of declining in credit quality and, 
with lapse of time, becoming a Defaulted Security.”181  According to the 
indenture, a Defaulted Security was defined as one “with respect to 
which there has occurred and is continuing any default or event of  
default under the related Underlying Instrument which entitles the  
holders thereof, with the giving of notice or passage of time or both, to 
accelerate the maturity of all or a portion of the principal amount of such 
obligations.”182  An Equity Security was defined as “any security that 
does not provide for periodic payments of interest at a stated coupon rate 
and repayment of principal at a stated maturity and any other security 
that is not eligible for purchase by the Issuer as a Collateral Debt  
Security.”183  Collateral debt securities could be sold only during the  
interest-only period, and after such a sale, the investment manager had 
to exert reasonable efforts to purchase substitute securities with an  
aggregate principal balance equivalent to the disposal proceeds within 
twenty days.184
The disputing parties agreed that about $8.5 million in face value of 
CRS sold for $4 million in December 2002 did not comply with the  
indenture.
 
185  But they disagreed on whether the sale of $66 million of 
defaulted securities was proper.186
                                                          
      177.   Id. at *2. 
  The plaintiff argued that the  
indenture required reasonable efforts on the part of the investment  
      178.   Id. at *6.  
      179.   Id. at *7. 
      180.   Id. 
      181.   Id. at *8. 
      182.   Id. at *9-10. 
      183.   Id. at *10. 
      184.   Id. at *8. 
      185.   Id. at *18. 
      186.   Id. at *19. 
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manager to replace the sold defaulted security within a particular time 
period.  In addition, another clause subjected any purchases to certain 
interest coverage tests.  Reading the two points in tandem, the plaintiff 
contended that securities could not be sold if the interest coverage tests 
prohibited replenishment.  However, the district court interpreted the 
contract language to mean that defaulted securities could be sold even at 
times when purchasing substitute securities was barred by the  
indenture.187
The critical issue before the district court concerned whether the 
improper disposal of the $8.5 million of CRS was material to the  
liquidation decision.
 
188  According to the indenture, if the aggregate face 
value of all of the securities in the Fund’s portfolio fell short of 110% of 
the aggregate face value of the outstanding Class A Notes, then Class A 
Note holders could proceed to liquidate the Fund without the junior note 
holders’ consent.  The court held that the sale of CRS, even if  
improperly executed, would have been immaterial to the senior note 
holders’ decision to liquidate.189  An additional $66 million of defaulted 
securities were sold in 2002 and 2003.  Even if the CRS had not been 
disposed of, the portfolio had lost more value since December 2002 
when the event of default had been declared.190  The court found that by 
March 2003, the Class A Note holders would have had the unilateral 
right to force the Fund to liquidate, concluded that the improper sale of 
the CRS did not cause any actual loss to the plaintiff, and dismissed the 
claims against SCM in their entirety.191
In re Plastech Engineered Products, Inc. is a bankruptcy case  
involving complex contractual issues related to an interest rate swap that 
a floating-rate borrower entered into to hedge its interest rate risk  
exposure on its secured bank debt.
 
192  Plastech Engineered Products 
(“Plastech”), an auto-parts supplier, filed for bankruptcy protection on 
February 1, 2008.  About one year before filing its Chapter 11 petition, 
Plastech refinanced its floating-rate secured bank debt.193
                                                          
      187.   Id. at *31. 
  It entered into 
a First Lien Term Loan Credit and Guarantee Agreement (“Credit 
Agreement”), raising $265 million from a syndicate of banks with 
      188.   Id. at *32-33. 
      189.   Id. at *36. 
      190.   Id. at *13, 35. 
      191.   Id. at *39-42. 
      192.   In re Plastech Eng'red Prods. Inc., 399 B.R. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008). 
      193.   Id. at 4. 
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Goldman Sachs serving as the lead arranger.  Plastech granted the  
lenders a first lien on its fixed assets under the Pledge and Security 
Agreement (“Security Agreement”).  A clause in the Credit Agreement 
required the borrower to hedge the interest rate risk on this debt.  
Plastech transacted a plain vanilla interest rate swap with Wachovia to 
satisfy this requirement.  Wachovia was neither a lender nor a party to 
the Credit Agreement or the Security Agreement when it entered into the 
swap.  According to the terms of the swap agreement, Plastech’s  
obligations to Wachovia were supposed to be secured claims ranking  
pari passu with the claims of the first lien secured lenders under the  
Credit Agreement.194  When Plastech started experiencing financial  
difficulties, Wachovia declared an event of default under the swap 
agreement.  Wachovia then terminated the swap prematurely and  
demanded a swap termination payment amounting to about $22  
million.195
The bankruptcy court determined that the monies Plastech owed 
Wachovia under the swap agreement would have qualified as a “First 
Lien Term Loan Obligation” under the Security Agreement only if the 
swap had been transacted with a lender under the Credit Agreement, that 
is, provided the swap counterparty was a lender at the time it entered  
into the swap agreement.
 
196  Since Wachovia was not a lender at the 
time it entered into the swap agreement, the obligations pertaining to the 
interest rate swap would not qualify as first lien-secured claims.197 The 
bankruptcy court sustained the objection of the first lien term lenders to 
Wachovia’s entire secured claim except for $1 million, which emanated 
from an assignment to Wachovia of $1 million of first lien term loan 
debt owed under the Credit Agreement. 198
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Financial derivatives are more complex than stocks and bonds.  
                                                          
      194.   Id. at 5.  Unfortunately for Wachovia, this provision of the swap agreement 
was inconsistent with the terms of the Security Agreement, which would allow pari pas-
su status under the latter agreement only if the swap counterparty was also a lender un-
der the Credit Agreement at the time it entered into the swap, which Wachovia was not. 
      195.  Id. at 7-8. 
      196.  Id. at 17. 
      197.  Id. 
      198.  Id. at 19.  Wachovia had purchased and taken an assignment of a $1 million 
interest in the bank debt governed by the Credit Agreement.  
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Consequently, they are harder to understand and more difficult to value.  
In addition, these instruments can be used to gain leveraged exposure to 
specific risks, which magnifies potential gains and losses.  These factors 
can combine to produce large losses for investors during periods of 
heightened market volatility.  Lawsuits are often quick to follow as  
investors try to recoup their losses.  In these court cases, investors often 
allege that the risks associated with the investment strategy and/or the 
profit potential were misrepresented by the investment advisor or that 
the risks were not explained at all when the fund manager solicited their 
funds.  Fund managers also face breach of fiduciary duty claims for  
allegedly inappropriately using derivatives or for using these “risky” 
products in the first place.  The rapid growth of the over-the-counter  
derivatives markets has opened the door for a number of fraud and 
breach-of-contract disputes because these markets do not provide  
transparent pricing.  In the early phases of product development,  
financial engineers can fail to foresee and account for certain  
eventualities, and unscrupulous promoters can exploit investors’ lack of 
familiarity with the new instruments.  In other cases, upon suffering 
huge losses, counterparties may seek to avoid losses by exploiting  
perceived contractual loopholes and refusing to pay, which inevitably 
triggers a lawsuit when the amount of the disputed payment is material 
to the other party. 
The current financial crisis forcefully highlights an important  
general principle: extremely rapid growth in the market for a new  
security is often difficult to manage with potentially negative  
consequences for all parties involved.  Over the last few years, while  
derivative product sophistication seemingly grew by leaps and bounds as 
the CDO and CDS products evolved and gained market acceptance, the 
risk management systems of banks, insurance companies, and broker-
dealers and the oversight provided by their regulators failed to keep 
pace.  Risks were diffused throughout the financial system but the 
amount of toxic assets on the balance sheets of regulated entities rose 
sharply until finally the credit markets seized up, and investors pulled 
back not only from the new markets but from all credit-sensitive markets 
until they could regain confidence in their ability to calibrate credit risk.  
The sheer magnitude of the financial sector write-downs suggests that 
many of the complex new securities were not very well understood even 
by those who structured them.  The litigation that has ensued also  
suggests that this lack of understanding was compounded by a  
potentially severe agency problem that resulted from the failure of  
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market agents to explain the riskiness of the new securities to investors, 
or to alert investors to their inability to understand them. 
With the credit crisis as a backdrop, the prognosis is for increased 
derivatives litigation involving complex structured products, as parties 
who believe they were damaged by the misuse or misrepresentation of 
these products seek redress through the courts or through the arbitration 
process.  Other consequences include tighter regulatory oversight of the 
banks and insurers participating in derivatives markets and greater  
standardization of derivatives contracts with larger volumes transacted 
on exchanges.  However, these trends do not portend boom times for 
structured product issuance anytime soon because market participants 
are likely to view the next round of innovative products with greater 
skepticism than they exhibited in the past - at least, one should hope so.  
If the litigation process helps curb the excesses that have been evident in 
the derivatives markets in recent years and encourages the proper use of 
these instruments, then everyone can benefit from the resulting  
improvement in market efficiency. 
 
